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Response to my Commentator
FABIO PAGLIERI
Goal-Oriented Agents Lab (GOAL)
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISTC-CNR)
Via San Martino della Battaglia 44, 00185 Roma
Italy
fabio.paglieri@istc.cnr.it

I am grateful to Steven Patterson for his insightful comments, and I am glad we
agree on the positive role that decision-theoretic approaches could play in
argumentation theory. However, we do have points of disagreement, so now I will
focus on three of his criticisms.
(1) Informal logic had historical reasons for moving away from formal theories in
general, including rational choice theory, and these reasons were valid at the time.
I agree, and my whole work on argumentation expresses deep sympathy for the
informal logic enterprise. In a sense, Patterson here is saying that it was strategically
rational for informal logic not to commune with rational choice theory, at that
particular time, regardless of the potential theoretical merits of that communion.
How could I possibly disagree with that, since I claim that strategic considerations
can, and sometimes should overrule other normative concerns? However, those
historical reasons no longer apply, and it is to present-day informal logicians that I
appeal for participating in this project.
(2) My taxonomy of argumentative decisions is highly familiar to any argumentation
scholar, since all those aspects have been discussed in the literature.
Indeed, the taxonomy was meant to be familiar. But what I claim is novel, as
partially missing in the extant literature, is a decision-theoretic approach to those
aspects of an argument. Not only to yield interesting empirical results, but also to
offer powerful modeling tools. These tools are not meant to replace current theories
of argument, but rather to complement them. And the fact that these decisiontheoretic models are to be applied to familiar concepts is not a problem.
(3) I fail to establish a “moral equivalence between strategic considerations and
considerations of reasonableness and argumentative fair dealing that derive from the
usual sense of rationality in play in argumentation theory”.
Yes, I do not provide reasons for such equivalence, instead I take it for granted and
discuss under what conditions one of these normative concerns is justified in taking
priority over others. And yes, I look forward to providing reasons for that
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equivalence in the first place. However, why should the burden of proof be
automatically or exclusively on me, rather than on those who do not consider
strategic rationality on a par with other normative concerns? What reasons do they
have to offer, other than “it’s obvious” or “we always thought so”? If accepting
strategic rationality as a valid normative concern for argumentation is questionbegging, the same applies to its rejection.
I suspect that the uneasiness of many argumentation scholars towards
strategic rationality is based on a slippery slope, which starts from “strategic”,
moves to “self-interested”, than goes to “selfish” and ends up with “immoral”. The
key mistake is in the confusion between self-interest and selfishness. As my
“political” example was meant to suggest, strategic rationality can lead to perfectly
unselfish outcomes, even when it conflicts with other normative criteria. That’s
because strategic rationality is completely neutral with respect to the morality, or
lack thereof, of the preferences in question.
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